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INTRODUCTION
The precipitate decline of a major industry presents problems for any
government but the collapse of the auto industry in America raises very
special problems: Autos have been America's "industry of industries" during
most of the twentieth century and America has uniquely lacked an industrial
policy addressed to the problem of declining sectors. Thus the crisis in
Detroit is a grave threat to the whole economy which brings in tow a crisis
in American thinking about government's role in the market economy.
This paper is an effort to think systematically about the problem of
industrial policy for declining sectors by reference to the case of the auto
industry. The task is organized in two parts. The first is an analysis of the
forces guiding the evolution of the industry and leading to the present situa-
tion. The second is a review of the options for fashioning an
industrial policy appropriate for the circumstances of the 1980's.
PART I. ANALYZING DETROIT'S MALAISE
The most prominent explanation for the decline in the preeminence of
Detroit derives from the work of Raymond Vernon in the 1960's [1]. It posits
an adverse turn in the product cycle in which the auto industry has become
broadly uncompetitive with foreign producers just at the time the domestic auto
.market has reached saturation. And certainly, the arrival of the fourth stage of
Vernon's produce cycle, characterized by growing exports back to the home market
from areas where the industry has developed relatively recently, does describe
much of the current situation.
However, product cycle theory scarcely helps to explain why the fourth
stage should arrive now. Nor does it incorporate two additional factors in
the current situation -- the emergence of independent foreign competition and
the development of national industrial policies for the auto sector in Japan
and Europe -- which seem central to recent events. Thus it appears that expla-
nations are required which go beyond the operations of the product cycle under
conditions of competitive capitalism. In order to develop these we need to begin
with a review of product cycle and international trade theory.
The Economics of International Trade and the Product Cycle
The evolution of economic thought about international trade has involved
a progressive relaxation of classical assumptions in order to produce a theory
congruent with on-going reality. The classical formulation of Heckscher and
Olin in the 1930's could as well have come from Adam Smith: In a world of static
products and competitive producers the key to the level and direction of trade
in manufactured.products lies in differing factor costs (corrected, of course,
for the trade damping effects of tariffs and transportation costs). Countries
with cheap labor export labor intensive products, countries with cheap energy
export energy intensive products, and so on. The problem with the comparative
advantage approach was that its elegance and simplicity were inversely related to
its explanatory Power. Wassily Leontief, in a famous article in the early 1950's [2],
reported that the U.S., with the world's most expensive labor, was the leading
.exporter of some of the world's most labor intensive products -- commercial
aircraft, for example, which are effectively hand made -- and that on balance
American exports were as labor intensive as American imports. Once the sanc-
tity of the Heckscher-Olin paradigm was breached, other empirical investiga-
tors in the 1950s quickly piled anomaly on top of anomaly.
Raymond Vernon, on pondering the faults of comparative advantage theory
in the early 1960s, focused on the assumption of a static product. In a
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world of rapid technical advance this seemed a particularly doubtful premise
and Vernon was able to present impressive evidence in a seminal article [3]
that products invented in and exported from one country might eventually be
exclusively manufactured in and imported back from a second country without
any change in comparative factor costs between the two countries. Vernon ex-
plained this phenomenon in terms of a "product cycle" with four phases [4]:
Phase I: Product/Process Invention and Production for the Home Market
The initial phase of the cycle is triggered when special conditions
in one country give rise to the creation of a new product or industrial
process. In the U.S. historically the circumstances yielding new pro-
ducts and processes have been the relatively low cost of raw materials
and energy, the relatively high cost and scarcity of skilled labor, the
high level of per capita income (creating demand for new consumer
products), and the enormous size of the domestic market. Thus American
entrepreneurs have had strong incentives to discover new ways of pro-
ducing consumer goods which require little skilled labor, even if rela-
tively wasteful of materials and energy, and which lend themselves to
scale economies of production for the mass market. And, in the initial
phase of product development, characterized by continuous adjustment of
product attributes based on experience in the market place, location of
manufacturing close to the point of sale has proved more important than
a location with the lowest factor costs. This is because demand for the
product is typically price inelastic (most "new" manufactured products
find their initial success as luxury goods) but highly sensitive to pro-
duct attributes and performance. Near-by location, of course, reduces
communication costs and response time in fine-tuning the product.
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Phase II: Saturation of the Home Market and the Search for Export
Markets
As the manufacturers in a new industry began to perceive the limits
of the home market they naturally look for foreign markets. Their
urgency in the search will depend on the nature of home market satura-
tion since for many manufacturers there will be perplexing choices be-
tween further elaboration of the product in the home market1 and a push
for sales abroad. The latter course will be particularly attractive for
firms intent on price competition in the home market since additional
production for export will often reduce average costs.
Phase III: Production of the Product in Foreign Markets
At the beginning of export sales the domestic manufacturers will
generally have a price or quality advantage in foreign markets by virtue
of the favorable circumstances which led to invention of the product in
the home market. However, as time passes, the product becomes more uni-
form ("commoditized"), and the volume of exports increases, domestic
exporters may find foreign manufacture of the product increasingly
attractive for several reasons.
First,. competitors (including other manufacturers from the country
where the product originated) may appear and shift the terms of com-
petition from product quality to price. This may encourage the original
producer to reduce transport, labor, and other factor costs, or to escape
tariff discriminationsby setting up shop in the "host" country. Second,
1 Product elaboration might involve a number of techniques. For autos these
have included annual model changes designed to speed turnover, a prolif era-
tion of product types for -- in the words of Alfred Sloan -- "every purse and
purpose": pickups, vans, sports models, compacts, super luxury models, etc.,
and an endless variety of options extended recently to include fuel economy
add-ons such as turbo-charging, five speed gearing and "lockup" torque
convertors. In some cases, and autos seem to be an example, the potential
for elaboration is so great that market saturation may be delayed for a very
long time.
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the volume of product imports may exceed the host country's ability to
finance through exports with the result that local manufacture is essen-
tial to increased sales. Third, host governments or local capitalists
may desire to promote local industry by requiring substantial local con-
tent in the exporter's product.
In any or all of these cases the decision by one of the originating
manufacturers to establish foreign manufacturing facilities will often
cause its home country competitors to do likewise. The alternative will
usually be to forfeit the foreign market in question since a firm ini-
tiating host country production will generally request and receive
generous tariff or local content requirement protection.
Phase IV: Export of the Product from Foreign Manufacturing Sites
Back into the Home Market
Again, as time passes -- and as the advantages of the initial
producers such as patents, other specialized knowledge, and physical
proximity to a rapidly changing consumer market, begin to fade --
foreign manufacturers may develop products or production processes com-
parable or even superior to those of the original manufacturers. And,
because of lower labor or other factor costs, it may be possible for
these manufacturers to export back into the home market. (In other
words, for fully develope'd, "commoditized" products where competition is
primarily on price the logic of the Heckscher-Olin comparative advantage
model reasserts itself. The analytic virtue of the product cycle model
is therefore seen to lie in its ability to explain why "younger" pro-
ducts behave differently. The adjustment it provides to the predic-
tions of the H-0 model is more or less proportional to the pace of
technical change.)
Phase IV generally develops after the home market has reached a
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saturated, "replacement only" stage and is therefore particularly omi-
nous for the original producers since import sales occur at their direct
expense. Original producers fearing the onset of phase IV have a choice
between market strategies (diversification out of the product
line, further elaboration of the product so as to effectively restart
the product cycle, a move to offshore sourcing, etc.) and political
counter measures coaxed from home governments (tariffs, local content
regulations, fiscal stimulation to increase the total size of the market
to be divided, and a host of others to be- considered in a
moment. ) The former are doubtless more attractive to producers since
they can be accomplished without political entanglements but they are
also generally less feasible due to the giant scale and low levels of
innovation in most oligopolistic industries approaching phase IV.
The incorporation of the product cycle initially seemed to greatly improve
the predictive capability of the comparative advantage model but as investi-
gators applied the hybrid model to a broader range of industries anomalies
again emerged. By the mid-1970s Vernon and others [5] were reporting that
phase IV seemed never to arrive in some industries no matter how "mature" the
product and that it arrived very quickly, in fact almost instantaneously, in
others. They concluded that in addition to factor costs and the maturity of
the product, analysis of trade must focus on the multinational structure of
industrial sectors. In general they found that in highly competitive sectors
containing rultinational corporations (e.g., electronics) the product cycle
was likely to proceed very rapidly with even initial production of "new" pro-
ducts (e.g., videodisks) concentrated in low factor cost countries. By
contrast, in sectors with tight multinational oligopolies (such, for example,
as the world auto industry up through the late 1960s) the cycle might even be
permanently arrested.
Vernon explained the latter phenomenon in the following terms [6]: A
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member of a multinational oligopoly which is not threatened with indepen-
dent competition is hardly likely to move production to the most favorable
factor-cost location for export back to the home market (i.e., to usher in
phase IV), and for three reasons:
(1) Any move of this nature exposes the producer to foreign political
risks since the foreign governments will typically not be so receptive as
the home government to manufacturer entreaties, or, if it is as receptive,
the foreign government will be more subject to overthrow and the producer's
property more subject to expropriation.
(2) Any move abroad exposes the producer to home country political risks
stemming from the loss of jobs and the negative consequences for the trade
balance.
(3) It is all pointless anyway since the oligopoly as a whole is unli-
kely to be concerned about consumer prices (unless dealing in a product felt
to be extremely price elastic), since the price-leader (in the case of an
American firm) probably cannot afford to increase its market share substan-
tially for fear of anti-trust action, and since the price-followers know that
any success in price competition due to an offshore move will be quickly
nullified by a similar move by the price leader.
Thus an industry dominated by multinational oligopolists will proceed to
phase III but- then arrest the cycle subject to an independent threat.
The Politics of International Trade and the Product Cycle
The Heckscher-Olin model of world trade modified to take account of the
product cycle would prove highly predictive of the direction and volume of
trade in a world of perfectly liberal governments (i.e., no trade barriers),
widely varying factor costs, and competitive industries. The progression of
industrial sectors through the phases of the cycle, ending in the drift of produc-
tion off-shore to low labor cost areas, would occur without interference from.
governments, and political analysis would add little to an understanding of world
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industrial development. However, even the most casual observation indicates
that the actions of nation states significantly alter the workings of the
product cycle and that state action is, in turn, the outcome of a continuing
struggle between factions within societies whose interests are best served by
facilitating the cycle, or retarding it, or even eliminating it altogether.
The objectives of the parties involved in product cycle policy debates
are the key to political analysis and are therefore of central interest here*
We may begin by examining the objectives of manufacturers whose need for
actions outside of the market context -- which we will label "political
action" and which consists of entreaties to home country governments for
various sorts of assistance--will vary in degree and nature with the phases
of the product cycle.
In the invention phase political action by manufacturers will generally
be minimal both for lack of need and for lack of leverage by small industries
to compel responses from the state. The key exception will be products or
processes with clear military applications but a limited consumer market in
the absence of assistance from the state with research, development and ini-
tial production. Producers of such products will often find it worth their
while to lobby for defense contracts which will increase the volume of pro-
duction runs, reduce costs, and make the product more attractive to private
2
consumers.
Producers entering the second or export phase of the product cycle will
invariably develop a passionate belief in free trade. Because their products
are by definition of higher quality and/or lower price than those of foreign
competitors (if any) home manufacturers have nothing to fear from reduction
of domestic tariffs. And, they may have much to gain for two reasons. First,
domestic tariff reductions may be bartered for foreign tariff reductions
2
This activity, it bears note, is only marginally "political" in that govern-
ment is the initial consumer, a very different sort of activity from use of
government power to alter market structures, exclude foreign competition, sub-
sidize products not needed by government, and so forth.
-8-
permitting greater sales volume for domestic products in foreign markets.
Second, even if foreign tariffs do not decline to the same degree as domestic
tariffs (as has been the case when Britain in the 19th century and the U.S.
after World War II pursued free trade policies) producers of dominant pro-
ducts will still benefit to the extent that absorption of imports in other
sectors by the home market stimulates foreign economies.3 Thus, in general,
one will find a nation's phase II industries behind the most vigorous
lobbying activities for reduced tariffs.
Industries in the third or foreign production phase of the product
cycle will generally find their need for government assistance focused on
favorable tax treatments for foreign investments, liberal rules on export of
capital, and, as their investments in other countries become substantial,
diplomatic or military initiatives to maintain political stability and pro-
tect investments. A domestic free trade policy will continue to stir
passions in the hearts of producers and for the same reason as in phase II in
that absorption of imports by the home market will spur the growth of foreign
markets. The ardor for free trade will generally cool at the home country
border, however, since producers may find great advantage in demanding high
tariff walls in the host country for establishing manufacturing. (They will
argue that in the host country they are effectively "infant" industries.)
Tariff protection will be particularly important if the foreign market is too
small to permit full economics of the scale and is therefore vulnerable to
imports produced elsewhere at higher volume.
The fourth phase of the product cycle presents a very
serious problem for declining producers who are suddenly highly vulnerable to
imports from countries with developing industries. James Kurth (7] cites
three forms of government assistance commonly sought by phase IV producers:
3The theory here is that a booming foreign economy will increase its level of
imports even over a high tariff compared with a stagnant foreign economy
which can find no outlet for its exports.
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1) Additional government-induced demand creation (perhaps including
credit preferences) to enlarge the domestic market for the product,
leaving room for domestic and foreign producers.
2) Government assistance in restraint or reduction of real wages and
benefits in order to increase profits. This will increase the amount
of capital available for reinvestment in research and production
facilities so as to make producers more competitive in world markets.
3) Abandonment of free trade to be replaced either with international
production cartels or protective tariffs in the homemarket.
To these might be added three more approaches:
4) Government assistance with research and development subsidies, in-
vestment tax credits, or restructuring of the "social cost" burden
through such techniques as value-added taxes,4 to give domestic pro-
ducers technological and cost advantages in world markets. 5
5) As an alternative to 4), elimination of government product and pro-
duction process regulation to permit producer cost savings and
higher profits which, as in 2) above, can be plowed into research
and new production facilities to make domestic producers more
competitive.
6) Additional government assistance with foreign investment opportu-
nities, particularly in the form of severance allowances and job
training for displaced workers, so that lagging domestic producers
can move more of their operations abroad to take advantage of
4
The contention of phase IV producers will be that social welfare costs
(social security, unemployment compensation, medical benefits, occupational
health and safety programs, and externality costs such as pollution control
equipment) are higher in the home country than for foreign producers. Thus
'these should be' financed with value added taxes applied both to domestic and
imported products rather than from employer/producer contributions.
5
In practice these measures will generally function as negative tariffs, as
foreign producers will be quick to point out. However, the case will be much
tougher to prove than for more direct means of restricting imports and this
feature enhances the attraction of this approach for domestic producers.
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favorable factor costs while exporting off-shore production back
into the home market. (This approach is, of course, consistent with
and in fact completely dependent upon continuation of free trade.)
The objective of these measures is either to increase the cost of foreign
products, to decrease the cost of domestically produced products, to 
restore
the technical/quality edge of domestic producers or to help them escape to
greener pastures.
So far we have considered only the perspective of producers and their
most likely political recourse at various stages of the product cycle.
However, other groups will also find the powers of the state useful for
steering the behavior of producers. Candidates for countervailing political
action will include competitors; other industrial sectors; the bankers,
suppliers and dealers tied to a producer or a sector; employees and their
unions; foreign governments and their client industries (who, as the Koreans
have recently illustrated, can play the Washington lobbying game just as
vigorously as the domestic contestants); groups which may be generically
labeled the "guardians of externalities" (e.g. Naderites); and even the state
itself and its bureaucracy.6 As with producers, the activities of these
groups are predictable within a broad range at various stages of the product
cycle.
In the first phase the major political issue is likely to be the oligo-
polization or monopolization of an industrial sector as scale economies edge
out all but a few of the original producers. The protests arise from small
producers facing extinction as well as from retailers and suppliers who find
6The proposition that the state bureacracy itself plays an independent
role in trade and industrial policy (rather than simply implementing the
policy of the victorious faction in the policy debate) is most often
suggested by observers of the French and Japanese political systems. In
France and Japan, where a centralized bureacracy is deeply entrenched,
government has seemed most powerful and independent in the immediate post war
period when industry was very weak. In America, by contrast, where a central
bureacracy has emerged only recently and where industry is (or at least used
to be) thriving, the analytic case for an independent government role is much
more dubious and will be considered only in passing here.
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the concentrated power of the major producers a threat to their independence. In
the case of the American auto industry, for example, Federal Trade Commission
and Congressional investigtions over the years seem to have been prompted'by
cries of anguish from losers in the oligopolization process rather than from any
widespread public demand for action. And, once the losers in these contests had
lost, the issue disappeared.
More salient disputes concerning government policy towards an industry
generally commence with the third or overseas production phase of the product
cycle and intensify in the fourth stage. The actors in the drama are the
industry and its unions and the issue is invariably the "export" of jobs.
While the self-interest and probable political actions of the groups
involved in the policy process are relatively easy to predict, the net result
of the pushing and shoving of many interests is much more difficult to
calculate. This is particularly so because industrial sectors and their
unions are likely to be the most powerful voices in the debate, but are also
likely to spread out over time along the product cycle. [8]
As a country begins industrialization, with most industries in their
infancy, a united front for protectionism and government financial assistance
is highly probable. Similarly, in a period of national decline when most
industries are no longer competitive in world markets, protectionism and
other forms of government aid to industry are to be expected. However, at
points in between, when some new sectors are still emerging, many others are
in phases II and III and the rest are in decline, the outcome is much less
certain. Indeed, the one constant in such periods will be the intensity of
conflict over trade policy, which will always be sharp because of the near
impossibility of protecting declining sectors without provoking retaliation
in foreign markets against leading sectors.
When one adds the additional complexity that the political strength of
industrial- sectors will vary with such factors as the size and geographic
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distribution of their labor force and retailer network as well as the rela-
tions between a sector and its bankers (who may also finance other sectors
with very different political needs) the power of the product cycle model to
predict specific events as opposed to broad trends must be rather modest.
The rest, as they say, is history.
In the next section we will review the history of the American auto
industry to see how much the product cycle model explains and to identify
factors which may account for the "variance" between the general predictions
of the model and the actual course of events.
The American Auto Industry and the Product Cycle
Phase I: Perfecting the Product and the Production Process
The auto as a workable apparatus was developed in Germany by Gottlieb
Daimler and Karl Benz about 1885 but the modern auto industry, with its mass
produced, low-price product, came into being in Highland Park, Michigan in
1914. At that point a vehicle type (the Model T) was combined with a produc-
tion process (the moving assembly line using minimal skilled labor) and a
labor relations pattern (relatively high wages coupled with extreme
regimentation) to create the auto industrial system which has changed
hardly at all in the intervening 65 years.
Prior to the breakthrough at Ford's Highland Park plant the auto indus-
try had been primarily a low volume, high price enterprise producing a cus-
tomized luxury product for the well to do, particularly for substantial
professionals such as doctors with a business use for the vehicle. Manu-
facturers were more properly termed "assemblers" since they bought parts from
suppliers (mostly wagon and bicycle makers, the industries from whence most
early auto makers came), assembled them and sold the vehicles to retailers.
7 The Model T was actually introduced in 1908. The production technology
and the labor relations model which completed the system were introduced
together in 1914.
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The financing of the assembly operation was remarkable in that none was
generally necessary - by the time the bill for the components came due the
cash was in hand from the retailer - and it is hardly surprising that many
followed Ford into the business, more than 250 in fact by 1908. [9]
Since the initial development of the Otto cycle engine and the prototype
vehicle had occurred in Europe it is not surprising that European companies
were active in the U.S. from the beginning. In 1905 imports had about 4 per-
cent of the market but foreign influence declined very rapidly to less than 1
percent by 1909 (a level not surpassed until 1955). The reasons, and they
constantly recur in the history of automobility, were in part the tariff (45%
on fully assembled vehicles) but more significantly a divergence in national
auto markets.
The European auto was designed for a largely upper class, leisure
market, which was hardly surprising given the income distribution and the
degree of urbanization. Furthermore, specifications were adjusted to meet a
a secondary military use. In fact, those agreeing to purchase vehicles
meeting military specifications could practically achieve a free ride: the
German, French and English governments each paid large "mobilization" sub-
sidies for vehicles earmarked for possible military use. As James Flink notes,
the effect "...was to discourage the manufacture of light cars in Europe
in favor of heavier touring cars...that would be better suited for use as
officers' staff cars..." £10] A few European manufacturers did attempt to jump
the American tariff wall by manufacturing in the U.S. -- Daimler-Benz between
1905 and 1913 and Fiat between 1909 and 1918 [11] -- but the luxury end of the
market was shrinking rather than expanding and they could develop no com-
parative advantage. Other European manufacturers developed a vehicle for the
mass market in the form of the motorized bicycle but these proved to have
limited sales appeal in America: they were largely worthless on unsurfaced
roads.
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Henry Ford and other auto entrepreneurs were also worried about roads
but failed in their initial foray into politics, the Brownlow-Latimer Federal
Goods Roads Bill. The measure, which would have involved the Federal govern-
ment in a program of rural highway construction, died in committee in 1903
and went no further until well after the auto was in mass production. [12]
Ford concluded that in the absence of a roads program a vehicle was needed
which could operate dependably in the mud. In addition, it should be pro-
ducible with a minimum of skilled labor (which was expensive in America),
should be easy to repair (since there was no service network), and should be
priced to tap the mass market of farmers with moderate incomes and poor road
access. The size of this market would in turn justify a capital intensive pro-
duction process.
The Model T precisely met this need with its high undercarriage (to
avoid sticking in the mud), its vanadiurn steel frame (to stand up to rough
surfaces while greatly reducing weight, again to avoid getting stuck), and
its low price. It quickly swept aside the motorized buggy -- essentially a
light horse-carriage equipped with a motor which had been the American equi-
valent of the European motorized bicycle -- and captured the entire low price
end of the market.
As Model T sales soared Ford was able to generate financing internally
to open a new plant in Highland Park in 1910 and to equip it with a con-
tinuous assembly line by 1914. As a result of the new technology he could
turn the unheard of trick of reducing prices drastically (from $850 in 1908
to $290 by 1922) while doubling wages (to the famous 8 hour, 5 dollar day in
1914.) The effect on industry structure was predictable -- only those firms
with the capital to diiplicate Ford's technology could survive and in practice
8
The $5 day helped Ford in two ways. It greatly reduced turnover which
had been as much as 60 percent per month, thereby reducing training costs and
boosting output per employee. And it drove up wage rates at Ford's competi-
tors whose production techniques were much more labor intensive.
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only one did. By 1923 Ford and General Motors had 71 percent of the car
market even though seventy producers were still in the business. Chrysler
was able to gain a foothold in 1927 when Ford closed for 9 months to re-tool
for the Model A, but otherwise the point of entry into the industry had
passed.9
With the development of the all-steel body and annual styling changes
in the late 1920's (both of which greatly increased tooling costs) and the
mass production of even luxury models, practically all of the independents
were eliminated. Finally, with the careful differentiation of models over a
wide price range (as perfected by Alfred Sloan at GM and reluctantly copied
by Ford) the mature auto market with its familiar oligopolist members was at
hand by 1929.
Three additional features of the mature auto-industrial system are
worthy of note. The first is the exclusive dealer franchises originated by
Ford and copied by GM and Chrysler. Under this arrangement dealers agreed to
handle only one maker's products and were in turn given what amounted to a
monopoly on a territory. From the manufacturer's standpoint the system was
attractive because it reduced the number of dealers to manage (compared with
a free entry system) and because, by increasing the size of dealerships, it
was thought to reduce dealer overhead costs and auto selling prices.
However, the system had one flaw from the manufacturers standpoint, which was
that dealers with a monopoly on a territory generally found it in their
interest to sell fewer cars at higher markups than the volume which would
maximize manufacturer profits. Thus was born the "forcing" system whereby
manufacturers set quotas for dealers' factory orders to be enforced in the
9 Kaiser-Frazer (1947-1955) made the last serious effort to break in using
technology identical to that of the big three. Several entrants are in the
wings today but with radically different technologies. These were developed
with government grants or subsidies (in the case of Mini cars) or are being
produced with government loans (in the case of DeLorean.) It is possible,
although very unlikely, that the recent shift in the environment (energy
costs and broader technical change) may be great enough for these new produ-
cers to succeed.
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extreme by cancellation of the franchise. Since the manufacturers also
quickly discovered that surges in demand and cash flow problems could be
alleviated by forcing vehicles on the dealer's it is hardly surprising that
much of the public controversy about the industry over the yearsjleading for
example to the Federal Trade Commission investigation of 1938, was generated
by dealers trying to gain some added leverage on the manufacturers. The
system survived until 1949 10, however, with the added consequence that entry
for new producers was made much more difficult.by virtue of the necessity of
starting an entirely independent dealer network. [13]
A second noteworthy feature of the system was the relative lack of in-
house technical innovation by the major producers from the very beginning.
Ford, of course, started as an assembler and believed he had assembled the
ultimate product. Research was therefore restricted to means of reducing
production costs. At GM a nearly disastrous experience in 1923 with the
Chevrolet "copper-cooled engine" (which led to the industry's first recorded
recall campaign when the engines failed to stand up to typical consumer
use) [14] convinced Alfred Sloan that product elaboration using proved tech-
nologies was a better idea for overtaking Ford. Responsibility for technical
innovations from that point was effectively transferred to suppliers where it
has remained to date. Given the modest resources of suppliers (compared with
the vastness of GM and Ford) and the great difficulty in convincing the manu-
facturers to adopt any radical technical change, it is hardly surprising that
the pace of innovation from the late 1920's to the late 1970's was extremely
10In that year, the Supreme Court ruled in Standard Oil of California
and Standard Stations Inc. vs. U.S. (337 U.S.293 (1949)) that oil refiners
could not enforce exclusive franchise agreements with their franchisees. The
case applied by extension to auto franchises and exclusive selling clauses
were from that point eliminated from franchise agreements. However, because
the post-war entrants were by this point on their last legs and because the
big three dealer networks were quite stable the decision had no practical
significance until the arrival.of the imports in the late 1950's, of which
more in a moment.
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modest.
A third noteworthy feature of the mature auto industrial system was the
labor relations system based on a combination of high wages and extreme
regimentation. Ford, for example, made it a policy to keep wages 20 to 25
percent higher than wages in other industries for comparable skills. This
damped the move to unionization both because wages really were high and
because Ford, with the assistance of Harry Bennett and his security
department, could be selective in hiring and weed out workers with union
sympathies. In return for the high wage, Ford demanded very hard work and a
minimum of feedback from employees. GM's approach was very similar and the
tactics were successful in delaying the arrival of the UAW until 1938 at GM
and 1941 at Ford. However, the policy carried a price for the long run in
that the high wage level in combination with adversial shop floor relations
made the industry vulnerable to both price and quality competition in the
post 1973 period.
What of the political tendencies of this "industry of industries"?1 2
On one level they are notable during the first phase of the product cycle
for their absence. The industury developed behind a high tariff wall
erected long before by other sectors, it perfected a product not immediately
in need of supporting infrastructure (i.e., a high quality road system),
and its research and development costs were so modest that the lack of
military interest was a help.rather than a hinderance. Thus the politics
of automobility were extremely limited. A major problem which did emerge
by the 1920's was the retarding effect on vehicle exports of the world
tariff structure, but this belongs properly in the next section. -
1 1William J. Abernathy, The Productivity Dilemma: Roadblock to Innovation
in the Automobile Industry, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978,
makes much of the extreme capital intensiveness of many existing production
processes such as engine transfer lines which acts to inhibit radical change.
1 2The phrase is Peter Drucker's in The Concept of the Corporation (New York:
John Day, 1946, p. 176) and aptly describes the industry even in the initial
phase of its development.
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Phase II - The Beginning of Export Sales [15]
The first and second phases of the auto product cycle are difficult to
distinguish chronologically because American producers pursued export markets
from the earliest days of the industry. Henry Ford, only a year after com-
mencing operations in Detroit (in 1903), established a subsidiary for
Canadian sales. And in 1905, in order to avoid the 35 percent Canadian
tariff on assembled vehicles, he commenced local assembly. General Motors,
founded in 1908, was exporting by 1911, and most of the other American manu-
facturers had some export sales even in their first year or two of operation.
In 1906, the first year for which reliable data are available, exports
exceeded imports by nearly fifty percent (1,850 units to 1,106) [16] and the
gap widened rapidly thereafter. However, to build a significant export
market American producers had to overcome several barriers.
The first, remarkably similar to that facing the Japanese in the U.S.
market a half century later, was a reputation for a cheap but low quality
product unsuited to European conditions.1 3 Olds and Duryea at the turn of
the century had exported one- and two-cylinder motorized buggies to Europe and
these had fared badly in comparison with European touring vehicles which
were only slightly more expensive after freight charges and tariffs. The
Americans needed a quality product which was cheaper than European models
offering similar performance. Ford, of course, had this after 1908.
The second problem was the rudimentary transport systems of the day and
the transshipping required to deliver American autos from Detroit fully
assembled. Ford soon discovered that considerable cost savings and increased
delivery reliability could be obtained by local assembly, even at low
volumes. Thus, Ford assembly plants were opened at Windsor, Ontario, in
13
Europe with its large population and high per capita income was viewed in
the early days as the prime export market although Argentina and Australia
eventually proved more lucrative.
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1905, at Manchester in 1911, at Bordeaux in 1913, and in Argentina, Brazil,
Denmark, Ireland, Spain and Uruguay by 1920. During the 20's additional
operations were started in Australia (at five sites), Belgium, Chile,
Germany, India (four sites), Italy, Japan, Malaya, Mexico, South Africa, and
Turkey, for a total of 28 assembly operations in 20 countries by 1929. [17]
Because Ford was intent above all on reducing costs and
believed that rapid growth in export sales could reduce the price of the
domestic product it is not surprising that Ford moved into foreign markets
more agressively than GM where Alfred Sloan was busy filling out the model
line. GM's first foreign assembly operation was only opened in 1923 but
thereafter, spurred by the fear of being locked out of foreign markets by
Ford, expansion was rapid. By 1929 GM had 19 assembly operations in 15
countries and 70 percent of GM's exports were assembled overseas. (18]
Although final assembly accounts for only about 15 percent of the value
added in automobile manufacture, [19] local assembly generally had the further
benefit of reducing tariffs more than proportionally to the value added.
This was important in terms of sales volume since demand was price elastic in
foreign markets with their lower per capita incomes and skewed income distri-
butions, even when, as was normally the case, there was no local competitor
with a product of comparable quality, much less at a lower price.
It is hardly surprising the American auto makers from the beginning were
enthusiastic free traders. James Couzens, secretary of the Ford Motor
Company and guiding hand behind Ford's early export drive, was telling the
House Ways and Means Committee by 1908 that Ford "...unalterably opposes any
increase in (the existing 45 percent] tariff. We believe that this so-
called infant industry is fully protected...and, in fact, we believe that the
present tax is a greater protection than this industry should have." He went
on to argue that the tariff should be set at a level to equalize the dif-
ference in American versus European labor costs which he characterized as
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"insignificant" due to the greater American use of machinery. (20]
After World War I Henry Ford adjusted his political sentiments (which
had been strongly isolationist prior to 1917) to correspond with his emerging
financial interests. He fervently supported the League and internationalism
and renewed his call for elimination of U.S. trade barriers, now extending it
to all products. The Dearborn Independent, Ford's magazine, routinely
denounced "the chemical-dye trust, the sugar trust, the lumber trust, and the
oil trust" for lobbying for higher tariffs and complained upon passage of the
Fordney tariff in 1921 that "...plainly the few big beneficiaries...have been
considered more than the consumer." [21]
General Motors also presumably found free trade in its interest, par-
ticularly as its foreign operations burgeoned.in the 1920s, but its manage-
ment maintained a discrete silence after 1920 when DuPont, the ring leader of
Ford's "chemical-dye trust", gained financial control in the wake of Billy
Durant's final disaster. The DuPont interest in GM, made possible and
necessary by DuPont's munitions profits from the first World War and its need
to rapidly find a new industry to invest them in, continued up until 1957,
leaving Ford to carry the public campaign for lower tariffs.
Phase III: Foreign Manufacture
The Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930, vigorously opposed by Ford and the re-
maining independents in the auto industry and by practically no one else,
effectively ended export sales from the U.S. as tariff walls sprang up all
over the globe. Exports peaked at 546,000 units in 1929 (10.2 nercent of total
U.S. motor vehicle production) and have been practically negligible as a per-
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centage of total sales since the depression. 14Ford and GM responded to the
1 4In 1978 the U.S. exported 955,000 vehicles, about 7.4 percent of pro-
duction.- However, two thirds of these were destined for Canada, from which
the U.S. imported 1.2 million vehicles. U.S. exports to and from Canada in
1929 were approximately zero due to tariffs but the North American motor
vehicle industry has been fully integrated since shortly after tariffs were
eliminated under the U.S.-Canadian Automobile Agreement of 1965. Thus, U.S.
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retaliatory tariffs imposed in almost all foreign markets by initiating full
manufacturing operations with very nearly 100 percent local content in
national markets large enough to make this profitable (and where they could
gain entry.) Ford built a scaled down replica of the River Rouge plant at
Dagenham, England in 193115 and more modest manufacturing facilities at
Cologne (1931) and Strasbourg (1934). A fourth European facility at Livorno,
Italy was planned but Giovanni Agnelli of Fiat vigorously protested to
Mussolini that a domestically owned industry was vital to Italian development
and government approval was denied.16 [24]
GM, because of its later entry into export markets and the crowded na-
ture of most national markets in Europe, chose to buy established manufac-
turers. By 1930 GM had acquired Vauxhall, a small English manufacturer, and
and Adam Opel, the largest German firm. Italy, however, was closed to GM and
repeated efforts to buy out French firims were unsuccessful (thereby saving GM
from the problems Ford-France encountered in an intensely nationalistic
market before finally selling out to Simca in 1954.)17
Chrysler, still struggling to develop a consolidated domestic line com-
14 (contd.)
and Canadian exports outside of North American are the best comparative
measure. In 1978 these totalled only 411,000 out of combined production of
14.7 million or about 2.8 percent. [22] Japan, Germany, France and Sweden by
contrast were exporting more than half of their domestic production in the
late 1970s. [23]
15
The Rouge and Dagenham were high water marks in vertical integration, con-
taining their own steel mills, foundaries, and glass making operations. As
such they were the extreme embodiment of Ford's notion that vertical integra-
tion to reduce production costs was the key to market dominance. Since the
early 1930's the pattern in the industry (including at Ford) has been toward
less integration except at facilities in less developed countries such as
Brazil and Argentina where the lack of local supporting industries has
necessitated in-house manufacture of all major components.
16The Agnellis have apparently lost their grip in the 1980s. Nissan has just
signed a major co-production agreement with Alfa-Romeo, Fiat's state owned
rival, to produce a new vehicle which will present Fiat with serious domesti-
cally produced competition for the first time since WWI. [25]
1Simca was itself the French owned survivor of a previous foreign incursion
-- Fiat France. It was purchased in turn by Chrysler in the 1960s and this
led to the defeat of a third multinational when Chrysler France was bought
out by Peugeot-Citroen in 1978 with strong government backing. [26]
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petitive with GM, stayed home until the 1960s, a decision central to the
firm's current troubles.
While the Smoot-Hawley tariff and the accompanying foreign reaction did
cause manufacturing to move from Detroit to foreign sites this development
should not be attributed to the economic logic of the product cycle. As Ford
Motor Company correspondence of the period makes clear18 none of the new
foreign manufacturing facilities could produce autos as cheaply as Detroit
even though they were 3500 miles closer to the consumer and using cheaper
labor. The problem was that even the European market as a whole was not
large enough to absorb the 400,000 copies of each model each year needed to
gain the full benefit of scale economies in auto manufacture. Thus corporate
decisions to move manufacturing were strategic, in response to political
decisions of foreign governments. They served to speed up the product cycle
which would otherwise have continued in Phase III, keeping practically all
production centralized in Detroit for some years to come.
A similar situation arose in the immediate post-war period when Australia,
Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa began to require nearly 100 percent local
content in autos sold in those markets. Ford, GM and Chrysler generally complied,
particularly to the extent they could gain guarantees that local production would
be limited to a few firms and that competition from firms without local manufac-
turing operations would be effectively banished by tariffs or quotas. However, in
each case production costs were actually higher than in Detroit despite lower wage
rates. Thus exports to third countries were not generally feasible and import
of the product back to the home market was not at all attractive.
This situation seems very curious, accustomed as we are to the notion
that countries with low wage rates should more or less automatically be able
to export at lower costs. However, in the case of the auto industry where
18Wilkens and Hill, op. cit., p. 240, review internal Ford correspondence in
which sales managers in other European markets pleaded with the home office
to be allowed to buy vehicles from Detroit rather than from Dagenham, Cologne
or Strasbourg due to the substantial cost savings.
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production labor is not a large share of value added and where scale econo-
mies are extremely significant, low labor costs do not necessarily translate
into export competitiveness. Costs at foreign sites are often inflated by
the necessity of producing practically all components in-house for lack of
supplier industries and by training and quality control costs due to inex-
perienced workers. Thus, a producer in small national markets such as the
countries requiring local manufacture after WWII would need to export 90 per-
cent or more of its output to increase volumes to an economic scale. This in
turn would require a tremendous foreign investment by the parent company and
a decision to write off a great deal of existing domestic capacity. This
generally does not occur in oligopolistic home markets, as recent experience
shows, until parent firms begin to encounter significant foreign competition
from independent producers.19
The first foreign production decision by American auto producers
based on economic rather than political factors was seemingly the
investment in Europe after the Common Market relaxation of intra-European
tariffs in 1959. Henry Ford II had been a major promoter of European
integration in the 1950s20 which was understandable given Ford's ineffi-
ciently large investments in small national markets. Once tariffs were
lowered Ford moved rapidly to rationalize production, lower costs, and
increase its scale of operations so as to increase its share of an otherwise
fragmented European market. composed of about 20 nationally oriented
19
For a more general discussion of the problems of establishing auto pro-
duction in less developed countries see Baranson, Automotive Industries.
20
In particular Ford campaigned tirelessly to lower American trade barriers
as a means of increasing exports of all European countries to the U.S. This,
it was hoped, would reduce the fears of individual European countries about
the effects of intra-European tariff relaxations. His speech in early 1953
to the Inland Daily Press Association (27] was the kick-off of this campaign
which continued even after 1959 and on up to the Kennedy round of tariff
negotiations. [28] Ford's continued enthusiasm was based on the belief that
the integrated European economy would boom (and its consumers would buy cars)
to the extent that North America provided a growing market for European
exports.
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producers. GM, ever concerned about being shut out, did likewise. Chrysler
brought up the rear buying up marginal producers in Britain and France as well
as their licensees in Spain.
Just as these decisions were being made the indigenous European produ-
cers were gearing up for greatly expanded European sales and an assault on
the American market which we may now characterize as the false dawn of phase
IV of the product cycle.
The conditions producing this situation are worthy of a moment's con-
sideration since they are in many ways similiar to those of the period twenty
years later when the arrival of Phase IV is again being trumpeted, this time
traveling from the opposite direction. After about 1931 the nature of the
European auto market changed radically. Personal incomes dropped precipi-
tately and gasoline taxes were raised dramatically to reduce petroleum imports
and support currencies. In a process rather similar to that underway now in
the U.S. European manufacturers decided that the environment of auto use had
changed and began to produce new products more suited to a spartan era.
Ford, for example, worked frantically to slash the weight, cost and fuel con-
sumption of the Model A (a process known today as "downsizing") and produced
the Model Y in only eleven months. 2 1
From this point the shape and scale of European autos were distinctly
different from.American autos and the differences persisted even in the post-
war boom years because all European governments faced foreign exchange
shortages and therefore kept gas taxes very high to hold down oil imports.
Initially the Europeans perceived no market in North America for their
products, a view seemingly confirmed by experience with the Model Y which
Ford of England attempted to export to Canada throughout the 1930s. Although
it faced no tariff (as a Commonwealth product), had low operating costs, and
21
See Wilkens and Hill, op. cit., pp. 240-247, for an account of the pro-
cess which highlights the simplicity of the industry even in that era com-
pared with today when three and more generally four years are required to
develop a completely new product.
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was cheaper than any other new car available in Canada, sales
were meager. However, by the mid-1950s as the prospect loomed in
Europe for a relaxation of trade barriers and higher intra-European produc-
tion volumes and as the North American market added two car families who
might seek greater diversity, the Europeans saw a chance. The recession of
1958-59 with its spur to economy mindedness was the trigger and European
import sales rose rapidly to 610,000 units in 1959, slightly more than ten
percent of the market.2 2
In the ensuing years some peculiar things happened to the European
threat. First, European currencies strengthened greatly against the dollar;
second, European wages rose more rapidly than American wages; and third, the
American producers (who were understandably reluctant to compete with their
own domestic products) became the most dynamic forces in the European market.
Thus.the typical European auto imported in America has evolved from the
cheapest (the VW of the 1950s) to the most expensive (Mercedes, Peugeot,
Volvo, BMW, etc.), volume has never much exceeded the level of 1959 (1979
volume was 557,000), Volkswagen itself is immigrating to
Pennsylvania and DetrJsg, and the European import share has fallen to about 5
percent of the total market 23 even during the current import flood. With
the exit of Fiat from the low priced market,24 the removal of remaining
Volkswagen production from Germany to Detroit (and Mexico) by 1983, and plans
by Detroit to compete more vigorously in the mid-sized luxury car market, it
2 2The Europeans were also ,aided by the fact.that domestic dealers were now
able, and in many cases wiling, to "dual." Thus, development of a dealer
network was much easier than for previous entrants.
2 3These figures are not the whole story because European imports are much
more expensive vehicles on average than Japanese vehicles. Thus as a percen-
tage of total dollar auto sales and import dollar sales their performance has
been somewhat stronger.
24See "Inflation, Exchange Rate Stymie Fiat," Automotive News, March 17,
1980, for an account of the demise of Fiat's low priced Strada model due to a
strengthened lira and rapidly increasing production costs, and the company's
attempt to recast itself as a luxury producer in the Volvo-Audi-BMW image.
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seems that the European threat is contained.
Phase IV: Import of Autos into a Saturated Home Market?
The extraordinary surge in Japanese market share and the collapse of the
new car market during the second energy crisis beginning in mid-1979 seem on
the surface to be strong evidence that the fourth stage of the product cycle
is at hand. And several of the domestic producers along with the United Auto
Workers are reacting as if it were. However, to reach a firm conclusion that
this is not another false dawn we need to look carefully at the nature of the
saturated market, the character of the Japanese threat, and the potential
responses of domestic producers.
As for the auto market, its most curious aspect is the extraordinary
period of time which has been required to reach a saturated, replacement-
only stage. In fact, it seems not to have been reached yet. After the pent
up demand of the war years was worked off by about 1955 (and as the last of
the independents, who had been'sustained in the sellers market, died off) the
market slumped from about a 10 percent per year increase in total motor
vehicle registrations during 1945-1950 to about 4 percent during 1955-
1960.25 However, the arrival of the baby boom generation at driving age,
additional elaboration of the product via the introduction of compact and
sporty cars, major government initiatives to improve the roadway system, and
Keynesian stimulation of the economy in the Kennedy administration served to
stabilize growth of total registrations during the years since 1955 in the
range of 4 percent (compared with population increases during the period
averaging about 1 percent per year.) And, as one looks at the next decade
25
Total motor vehicle registrations seem to be the best measure of the
strength of the market for several reasons. First, it is important to
include trucks along with cars since the same producers make both and we are
concerned here with the overall health of the industry. Second, registra-
tions are a good bit less volatile from year to year than new car sales and
thus rates of increase are easier to estimate. Third, producers achieve a
considerable portion of their profits from replacement and crash parts sales
which correlate more nearly with total registration than with new vehicle
sales.
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with the need for a new fleet of energy efficient vehicles and the oppor-
tunities this provides for further elaboration of the product,26 it appears
that if phase IV is imminent market saturation is not a major reason.
Even assuming continued growth in the auto fleet the surge of Japanese
imports is impressive evidence of phase IV. What can we say about the
nature of this threat? Perhaps its most significant attribute is the inde-
pendence of the Japanese auto industry from the American multinationals.
27Just how this came about is not altogether clear but it is striking that
Japan has been the only country in the post war world to develop its auto
industry in isolation from Ford, GM, and Chrysler.
Contrast the experience of European producers in their assault on the
American market beginning in the late 1950s: Eyen as they directed their
attention to the U.S., GM, Ford and Chrylser were stepping up their efforts
in the European market where GM and Ford were already well established.
Massive investments in new plant initially permitted the Americans to export
cars to the U.S. to compete with other European imports in the compact car
market. However, the American producers had nothing to gain from competing
with their own domestic lines of larger cars since this would have threatened
their massive investments in U.S. production facilities. Instead, once the
domestic compacts were in production American imports from Europe were phased
out and the spare European capacity was turned aggressively to price
competition in the European market, made possible by the high production
2 6General Motors, for example, has announced plans to market a two seat
"commuter car" in 1983 and an electric vehicle in 1984.[30] And Chrysler,
even as it abandons the full-size end of the market, has announced plans for
a range of fuel-efficient mini-vans and mini-trucks to be built in the mid-
1980s on the K-car chassis. [30] The hope of automotive product planners is
that as gas prices rise and fuel efficiency is demanded for urban cars the
number of vehicles per household will increase since several types of
vehicles will be needed to accomplish the full range of trip purposes.
27
John Roberts [31) provides considerable detail on the American occupation
and the origins of "Japan, Inc." but offers no explanation of the impotence
of Ford and GM in gaining entry to the Japanese market despite their success-
ful entry into every other country in the non-communist world.
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volumes. As a result, the Europeans were soon thinking less about exporting
to America and more about meeting American competition in their home markets.
The European lesson was not lost on the American multinationals but then
neither was it lost on the Japanese who successfully resisted repeated
American efforts to gain low tariff access for American vehicles and, later,
to buy controlling interests in Japanese producers. (33] Increasing American
ownership has been permitted over the years -- GM acquired a 34 percent
interest in Isuzu in 1973, Chrysler (prior to its recent troubles) obtained
15 percent of Mitsubishi Automotive, and Ford purchased a quarter interest in
in Toyo Kogyo (Mazda) in 1979 -- but under the Japanese system of corporate
finance where one or a few banks own the remainder of the stock the American
shares confer nothing in the way of corporate control.28 Japanese law has
permitted 100 percent foreign ownership since 1978 but none of the remaining
stock is for sale (even if the American companies at this point had the cash
to increase their interest) and it appears that the Japanese financial com-
munity would prefer to risk tariff or quota exclusion from the U.S market
rather than permitting multi-national control of Japanese producers.29
The contrasting European and Japanese experiences serve to confirm the
observation of the neo-Vernon school that in the absence of an independent
28
Recent evidence that the American shares provide some profits for Detroit
but little in the way of control lies in Isuzu's announcement that it will
establish its own dealership network in the U.S. and begin importing cars to
compete directly with GM's compact and subcompact models. [32] Mitsubishi is
reported to have similar plans for 1982 and Mazda.has retained the dealership
network it had developed before Ford acquired its interest.
9Despite much multi-national ballyhoo to the contrary about restrictive
Japanese import practices, Japanese producers would actually face no threat
from American imports even with totally frictionless import and vehicle cer-
tification procedures. (All tariffs have already been removed making Japan
practically.the only country with no auto tariff.) Ford Motor Company
Executive Vice President Fred Secrest in a speech at MIT May 14, 1980 esti-
mated that at then current Yen/Dollar exchange rates (roughly 240Y=$l) the
Japanese enjoyed an $800 per car cost advantage for compact cars landed on
the U.S. west coast. By extension, the Japanese home market cost advantage
over comparable U.S. vehicles would be about $1100. Thus the only hope for
the American companies, as has long been recognized in Detroit, is to purchase
Japanese companies, invest heavily, and undersell the other Japanese produ-
cers in their home market on the basis of higher volume.
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foreign producer the fourth stage of the product cycle may never arrive in
the country where the product originated regardless of factor prices in other
countries. If the producers from the originating country lead a world oligo-
poly (as was the case with American auto producers from the 1920s
until the mid-1970s) they will have little of an economic nature to gain from
a move to off-shore production with imports back to the home market no matter
how cheap labor or other factors of production may be in other countries:
Captive imports will simply undermine the value of their home country
investment. And they may have much of a political nature to lose by a move
off-shore. The American dominated oligopoly of the post war period therefore
arrested the product cycle in phase III and, in
the absence of the independent behavior of the Japanese, Detroit would have
sailed happily into the 21st century as the continuing world auto champion.
Prices to consumers would doubtless have been somewhat higher but the
employment base and profits of the industry would have been secure.
Key supporting evidence for this conclusion lies in Detroit's use of its
manufacturing investments in less developed countries with lower labor costs.
GM, for example, has manufactured (not merely assembled) automobiles in
Argentina since the late 1940s and in Brazil and Mexico since the early
1960s. And labor costs in each country are a fourth or less of U.S. wages.
Yet GM made no plans to expand output to an efficient level and to export the
extra production back to the U.S., until the extent of the Japanese threat
became apparent in 1979. Ford's behavior has been identical as was
Chrysler's prior to the loss of its overseas empire in 1979. Clearly the
advent of "world car" and the move to integrate world-wide production by the
American multinationals owes rather more to the Japanese and rather less to
the product cycle than would have been the case if the American auto industry
had consisted of twenty fiercely competitive independents instead of the Big
Three.
-30-
Japan as possessor of the world's most dynamic and carefully coordinated
economy is a formidable competitor in the short run, particularly during the
next two years while Detroit prepares new models suited to the new energy
order, but Japan is clearly the wrong country to sustain the fourth stage of
the product cycle. A moment's reflection indicates that Japan would only be
able to do so if its social control and financial management mechanisms were
adequate to permanently hold wages below levels in other advanced countries
with comparable standards of living and to keep the yen weak in relation to
the dollar. Otherwise Japan will follow the path of Germany where wage
increases and a strong mark priced Volkswagen out of the North American low-
price market.
Japanese wages may continue to lag somewhat due to the system of company
unions, the weakness of the socialist parties, and the advantage for manage-
ment of conducting wage negotiations in the "us-versus-them" framework which
is possible so long as the producers are domestically owned 30, but the yen is
another matter. It has been marching resolutely onward and upward since August
1971 when the yen was slowed to float against the dollar. The merest hint of
an energy crisis sets this process back since Japan is practically 100 percent
import dependent for energy, but it is clear that barring a middle eastern
political disaster the yen must, within a few years and possibly much sooner,
reach the 190Y = $1 level which is conventionally cited as the point where the
Japanese production cost advantage disappears.[34] (As this was written the
yen had strengthened to 210Y = $1 from 250Y = $1 in April 1980 at the height
of the Iran crisis. The yen actually passed the 190Y = $1 level very briefly
in October 1978, the month before Iran fell apart.)
Thus a long range perspective suggests that the true significance of the
Japanese threat lies in breaking the American led auto oligopoly which was
3 0However, it is important to remember that the seniority based wage system
will exert additional upward pressure as the Japanese auto industry matures.
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able to damp price competition in the post-war period and thereby avoid phase
IV. It should be clear that if this analysis is correct a continuation of price
competition in the absence of significant elaboration of the product will inevi-
tably lead all major world producers, American, European, and Japanese, to source
most vehicle componenets in low cost areas, principally Argentina, Brazil, Mexico,
Taiwan, Korea, and Malayasia.
PART II. THE SEARCH FOR INDUSTRIAL POLICY
The rapidity of Detroit's collapse and the lack of public policy precedents
to deal with declining sectors has thrown both Detroit and Washington into a
gigantic muddle. One government agency, the International Trade Commission, has
ruled that imports are not the problem (i.e., that phase IV is not really here),
another, the Department of Transportation, has campaigned under a Democratic and
now a Republican secretary for import restrictions, the White House under Carter
and Reagan has played for time by commissioning studies, and Congress has passed
a resolution urging the president to act decisively to halt the Japanese flood.
The automakers, for their part, have split on trade policy, flip-flopped in
their attitudes toward government assistance with product development, and cast
about erratically for "southern strategies", robotics, off-shore component sourcing,
and other means of altering the industry's relation to its workers.
Our modest contribution to this debate will be to outline the options before
the automakers and their employees in the absence of government assistance and
to compare these with the range of government actions which might be fashioned
into an "industrial policy" for the auto sector.
"Self-Help" for the Auto Industry and Its Workers
An obvious route to industry self-help is to accept the logic of phase IV
and move production to low labor cost areas. Ford and GM have apparently accepted
this argument at least for the compact and subcompact markets. Both have recently
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announced major
investments in Mexico, Brazil, Taiwan, and Malaysia as well as co-production
of components with several Japanese producers in which they own partial
interests. The scale of the investments is enormous given the size of these
national markets and it seems inevitable, although the companies have not
stated this explicitly, that most of the output is destined for the U.S.
Indeeed, William Abernathy of the Harvard Business School has argued that the
economics of auto production are now such that in the absence of decisive
government action to support the U.S. industry American producers will shift
practically all the value they are now adding to domestically produced
vehicles to of f shore production sites within 10 to 15 years. [35] Final
assembly will doubtless be retained in the U.S. so that the vehicle can be
labeled "American made", particularly since the final assembly operation,
which now only acounts for 15 percent of the value added, can be automated
with robots to reduce the use of expensive American assembly labor to a very
low level.
This approach to the problem has caused some embarrassment for Ford
recently due to the inconsistency between the company's appeal for import
protection and its furtive moves toward foreign production of engines for its
new subcompact cars31 but the industry is likely to be tenacious in pursuing
it. One of the industry's most important weapons in efforts to make such
moves politically acceptable will probably be government assistance in
finding new jobs or providing long-term unemployment benefits for displaced
31
Details of Ford's corporate thinking on the problem of moving off-shore were
leaked to Senator Metzenbaum of Ohio who passed the material along to the New
York Times. An assessment of the political problem facing the company pre-
pared by the company's Office of North American Governmental Affairs noted:
"The juxtaposition of any such action (a move to Mexican sourcing of compact
car engines) with whatever push Ford may make to restrain Japanese imports
needs to be weighed. The credibility of any effort we make to impose local
content requirements or quotas on the Japanese could be undercut by our
sourcing engines [off shore) for Ford's U.S. cars. On the other hand, we
could say, quite correctly, that the competitive situation in the industry
compels us to take advantage of some low-cost sourcing to keep up.with other
manufacturers."
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workers. Existing legislation under the Trade Act of 1974 was adopted at the
behest of the United Auto Workers and has had the ironic effect of damping
32
resentment toward the Japanese invasion but much more vigorous measures
would be needed if the industry wishes to move off-shore in a major way. And
this raises the obvious question of where the work force finds work when the
industry of industries leaves town.
Even as Detroit tentatively embarks for offshore production, it should be
clear that this step is broadly undesirable to the major producers (for poli-
33
tical and economic reasons) and to their workers (on obvious economic grounds)
Several other paths to self-help are clearly preferable: (1) diversification
or product or process elaboration, (2) reduced labor costs, and (3) industry
restructuring to incorporate the Japanese producers in a new world oligopoly
where the competition (if any) is on some other basis than price. What are the
prospects for these alternatives?
(1) What might be termed "technical self-help" might take several forms. One
would be to diversify out of the auto business into new growth sectors. A second
would be to introduce new capital intensive production technologies which reduce
costs while improving the quality of the product. A third would be to introduce
a new product -- an electric car, for example, with operating and production
costs lower than competing internal combustion vehicles but with comparable
performance -- which could not be quickly duplicated by foreign rivals. However,
none of these offers much hope.
Where, after all, does the "industry of industries" diversify, particularly
given the industry's lack of success with non-auto product lines in the
32
It is important to remember that relatively few auto workers are now feel-
ing the full effect of the slump in domestic sales. More than 90 percent of
the workers on indefinite lay-off are receiving supplemental unemployment and
trade assistance payments which may total 95 percent of their base pay. Both
types of payments run for up to as much as eighteen months. Thus the real
impact of the auto slump on the work force will become apparent later in 1981.
334k
Of course, this step might be a bonanzg for consumers in the advanced
countries and for auto workers in Brazil, Mexico, etc. As always with trade
policy, what you think depends on where you sit.
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Investment in more
the 1960s and 1970s. 34
capital intensive production facilities might have offered some promise in
years gone by, but the technology is as available to the Japanese as it is to
the Americans35 and the financial strength of the Japanese industry compared
with the growing weakness of the American industry makes it increasingly
unlikely that the U.S. producers can gain any advantage via the high tech-'
nology route.36 Finally, no new products are on the horizon which migh pro-
vide a technical/quality edge to American producers.
(2) Since wages account for a very large portion of auto production costs
and since the heart of the American dilemma in phase IV is our historically
high wage level, the producers understandably find a new wage policy keyed to
foreign wages highly attractive. Initial efforts in this direction in the form
of General Motors's "souther strategy" of building new production facilities in
sun-belt states with anti-union traditions have been inconclusive [38] but the
latest round of the Chrysler loan negotiations suggest that union attitudes may
be changing in the face of massive job loss. Chrysler workers have agreed to
34GM left the aircraft business after WWII, sold its.money losing home ap-
pliance line in the late 1970s and has just sold its Terex construction equip
ment division in order to raise cash for new auto tooling. [36] Ford tried
but failed in the consumer electronics business in the 1960s through its
purchase and subsequent sale of Philco. Chrysler never diversified beyond
such near-automotive activities as tanks and marine engines (which have been
grouped together to expedite sale as a last gasp measure if the company's
fortunes continue to slide.) And American Motors suffered large losses in th
transit equipment business in the 1970s -- before abandoning the field to
GM. Thus the companies have -never diversified with success in any direction
and would probably encounter an additional problem with large scale diver-
sification in that acquisitions of an attractive size would entail problems
with the Clayton Act in the absence of a congressional exemption. [37]
3 5Following industry practice, most of the development work on
robotics has been underwritten by independent vendors not controlled by
Detroit. As a result the industry has very little proprietary technology.
36
More ominously, it appears that the Japanese are determined to travel
this path even if the Americans don't and dramatic American productivity
improvements may be essential simply to stand still. In part, automation
addresses anticipated Japanese labor shortages in the 1980s and the delayed
impact of the seniority based wage system. Perhaps more important, it serves
to "Korea-proof" and "Taiwan-proof" the Japanese industry in the event that
the predominant American multinational counterattack comes from the produc-
tion facilities now under development by the Americans in those countries.
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forego wage increases during the remainder of their contract with the result,
assuming continued inflation in the 10-12 percent range, that their real wages
will decline by about one quarter.
GM and Ford have taken note of the Chrysler agreement, vowing to achieve a
comparable wage agreement in the next contract. However, prospects for a substan-
tial reduction in real wages are unclear. The issue is tied intimately to the
survival prospects of GM and particularly Ford, the market success of new models
being introduced, and the terms of any negotiations on tariff protection.
(3) The third alternative to a rapid march off-shore is simply for governments
to stand by while the leading American, European, and Japanese manufacturers
make a deal. And this process is well advanced already: Renault has obtained
a controlling interest in American Motors and owns 10 percent of Volvo (with
an option for greater participation); Peugeot has purchased Chrysler's properties
in France, Britain, Spain and Argentina; GM has just acquired a 100 percent
interest in Saehan Motors, South Korea's third largest producer, as part of its
now familiar gambit to buy out independent producers before they become a serious
export threat 37; Nissan and Toyota are negotiating for purchase of Seat of Spain;
Chrysler is practically under government order to quickly find a merger partner
as a condition of the most recent loan guarantee; etc.
Co-production agreements are proliferating even more rapidly: Renault is
co-producing engines and other mechanical components with Volvo, Peugeot, and
Fiat; Peugeot, in addition, is negotiating with Chrysler to produce large models
in the U.S.; Nissan will be in co-production with Alfa-Romeo in the south of
Italy in 1984; Fiat has marketing and co-production plans with Saab in Scandanavia
Recent events in South Korea raise two interesting additional possibilities.
The new government has just ordered one of the country's three auto makers closed
and the other two to be merged. If Korea has in mind a Japanese style independent
assault on the world market it clearly must expel the multinationals and this may
be the key step. Alternatively, GM may have sewed up the industry (the GM firm is
one of the two to be merged) and have plans for the Korean production facilities
as a key element in its counter attack on the Japanese in the American market.[39]
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and with Peugeot in Latin America; Honda is co-producing an auto in Britain with
BL Ltd.; and Ford and Toyota are negotiating a major co-production deal in the U.S8
The popularity of this approach lies in its usefulness for ending price competition
(since the mechanical components in various makers' lines become practically
identical even though the sheet metal is different) without the need for mergers
(which threaten national sovereignty) or more direct collusion (which at least in
the U.S. and Germany runs counter to anti-trust laws.) And it gives the auto makers
considerable latitude in sourcing which may provide greater leverage in labor
negotiations and tariff disputes.
The conventional wisdom in the auto industry now holds that only six or
eight companies (out of 19 now producing 100,000 or more passenger cars per year
in the non-communist world) will survive into the 21st century. And the spread of
co-production agreements might easily reduce the true degree of competition to
practically zero.
The march toward re-oligopolization seems certain to present ironic and
troublesome choices for American public policy in the near future since the options
will be rather stark: In the absence of successful industry self-help or effective
industrial policies for auto industry "revitalization" (where "effective" measures
are defined as those which cannot be easily matched by the governments guarding
the competing producers) a truly competitive world industry will drift inexorably
off-shore. A revitalized oligopoly may provide an easy means of dealing with the
problem -- drift will cease since the producers will no longer compete on price,
.and the costs in the form of higher consumer prices and reduced rates of innovation
will be largely hidden -- but such an approach will require an explicit acknowledge-
ment that competitive capitalism is no longer compatible with American interests
when key industries enter the fourth phase of the product cycle.
3 8 The European producers have also initiated an effort to "co-produce" new
technologies. Renault, Peugeot, Fiat, Volkswagen, BL, and Volvo have recently agreed
to pool their long-term research efforts. The intent may be, as announced, to steal
a march on the Americans and Japanese but an equally likely result would seem to be
that no European producer will disadvantage its "competitors" by means of a
technical coup.[40]
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The Options for Industrial Policy
Given the uncertain prospects for industry self-help and the incompatibility
of re-oligopolization with American ideology i-t is hardly surprising that interest
has grown recently in industrial policy approaches of the sort outlined above
(pp. 10-11). These include (1) government induced demand creation; (2) tariffs
or quotas on imports; (3) government assistance with research and development, with
new plant, and with regulatory and social welfare costs; and (3) government
assistance in de-emphasizing the role of auto production in the economy.39
In the terminology of William Diebold [ ], the first three activities may
be labelled protective in that they aim to preserve the existing industry: Demand
stimulation does this by creating a larger market so that both domestic and foreign
producers will find an outlet for their products. Tariffs and quotas increase the
price of foreign products. Assistance with product development, social costs, and
externalities reduces the cost of domestic products in comparison with imports.
The latter activity (industry de-emphasis) is essentially adaptive, involving an
acknowledgement that auto production is no longer viable domestically coupled with
a search for better uses in other sectors for the industry's work force. This
approach has proved a formidable challengeoeven for those governments (e.g., Japan
and France) finding it compatible with their political and social traditions. And
in America it has hardly been suggested. Thus our discussion will be limited to
the political and economic implications of protective policies.
Government induced demand creation is strongly advocated by the
-industry and the UAW as a means of reviving the market. This
approach is hardly a new departure for the industry since Henry Ford
II was one of the most persistent advocates of the Kennedy tax cuts
of the early 1960s as a means of dealing with the false alarm caused
by fears of a European-borne phase IV. [41] And, since 1960, the auto-
makers have generally backed Democratic presidential candidates on
the strength of their Keynesianism as well as the traditional
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A fourth approach cited on p. 10, government actions to restrain real
wages, has been employed in emerging countries such as Brazil and Argentina but
has not been on the agenda in the U.S. and will not be considered here.
Democratic support for free trade. However, the industry has argued
with special fervor for tax cuts and an end to credit restrictions in
1979-80 on grounds that the auto industry has been singularly disad-
vantaged by tight consumer credit and the recession just at the point
when massive new spending is required to introduce new products
suited to the new energy price structure.
Free trade has been decisively abandoned by Ford, Chrysler, a number of
the suppliers such as the tire companies, and the UAW who have proposed
various sorts of import quotas or tariffs but the prospects for protectionism
are uncertain. One problem lies in the stance of GM whose continuing support
of free trade splits the American industry. GM's strategy has been variously
interpreted and may involve a simple business calculation that GM's "import
fighters" scheduled for introduction in the next few years will recapture most
sales for American producers. Other interpretations more plausible to GM's
competitors are that GM will benefit from the departure of Ford and Chrysler
from the full size and intermediate segments of the market in order to con-
centrate on the compact and subcompact sectors. Once import competition has
forced this choice, leaving more room for GM in product lines where it can
compete more effectively with the Japanese, the company will discover that
protectionism is a prudent policy after all. An alternative interpretation
holds that GM plans to meet the import challenge by moving much of its compo-
nent production off-shore.and that continued support of free trade is essen-
tial to this strategy.
A second impediment to protection of the domestic market is the attitude
of the nation's new car dealers. When Chrysler chairman Lee Iacocca and Ford
executive vice-president William Bourke addressed the 1980 convention of the
National Automobile Dealers Association to urge adoption of a resolution in
Support of tariffs, they encountered intense hostility and the asociation's
directors instead adopted a resolution opposing any form of quotas or tariffs.
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The response should have been predictable considering that more than two
thirds of the 24,000 U.S. dealers sell imports. 40 With an average of about
sixty dealerships per Congressional district, and considering the hard sell
attitude of car dealers and their willingness to contribute to campaigns,4 1
it is hardly surprising that the dealers have become one of the most effec-
tive free trade lobbies. And they are likely to become even more organized
and united in their support since dealers without an import line are madly
scrambling to find one. 42
A third impediment to protection of the auto market is the inflationary
consequences of import restrictions. While -estimates vary widely on the net
43cost of import restrictions to society the price of both imports and
domestic vehicles would surely rise substantially if imports were
4 0 See "Fight Over Import Growth Dominates NADA Meeting", Automotive News,
February 18, 1980, for details of the convention's response. Note however
that two thirds of the dealers also sell domestic makes, evidence of the
degree to which exclusive dealing arrangements have declined since 1949.
41 In the 1978 election the NADA political action committee made $1 million in
contributions to Congressional candidates, out spending the UAW and the
AFL-CIO and second only to the PAC's of the doctors and the realtors. In
1980 $1.2 Million had been raised by August and this- was widely understood to
be only the tip of the iceberg since dealers make additional contributions at
the $100 personal limit in their own names and through their employees. The
results can be impressive. Witness, for example, a Republican senator's
explanation to a Times reporter of his decision to vote for the Chrysler
bail out: "I don't have any plants in my state but the dealers were all over
me." [42]
4 2Isuzu, for example, has announced plans to develop a dealer network by con-
centrating on dealers lacking an import line. A spokesman noted that too many
rather than too few applicants is the company's current problem.[43]
4 3 President Carter's Automotive Task Force has reported that limiting
Japanese auto imports to 1979 levels would put 100,000 auto workers back to
work but would raise the price of new cars by as much as $1 billion.
Congressman Bob Traxler (Dem. Mich.) has rejoined (in a letter to the New
York Times, July 27, 1980) that the $1 billion cost to the consumer in new
car purchase price increases is many times outweighed by the $7.5 billion
annual social welfare cost to the taxpayer of supporting 100,000 unemployed
auto workers and 200,000 workers in other industries whose jobs are elimi-
nated with each 100,000 drop in auto industry employment. Eric Toder [44]
has conducted the most sophisticated econometric analysis to date on the
effects of auto tariffs, reporting that as conditions existed in the 1975
sales slump the benefits to American society as a whole from any of a range
of tariff policies were far outweighed by the additional costs to consumers.
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restricted. Indeed, if restoration of the competitiveness of the domestic
auto industry is the justification for import restrictions it may be vital
that domestic producers raise their prices to generate the revenues needed
for retooling to meet foreign competition in the future without tariff or
quota protection. However, the political consequences of price increases are
likely to be severe for the public officials approving quotas, and the
disgruntlement of millions of consumers may appear to outweigh the antipathy
of hundreds of thousands of auto workers, particularly in the majority of
Congressional districts lacking auto assembly and parts plants.
Yet another barrier to protectionism in the auto sector, but one too
broad to fully analyze here, is the resistance of other industrial sectors
still broadly competitive in world markets. The aerospace industry, for
example, has in Japan its best customer and is doubtless strenuously
resisting any suggestion that Japanese autos be kept out of the U.S. for fear
of retaliation against aircraft exports.
This raises a final problem with auto protection which is just what the
Japanese would do with their excess workforce if their autos were excluded
from the American market which now accounts for one fourth of the Japanese
industry's total sales. One use for the excess labor would lie in deve-
loping an independent aerospace industry and one use for an aerospace
industry once developed would be to pursue an independent foreign policy.
Such prospects are certain to set off alarms in the minds of all but those
It is sometimes asserted that import restrictions could be negotiated not
just with the Japanese but also with American domestic producers so as to
prevent price increases. [45] However, this leaves the problem of policing
new car dealers who have been hurt as badly as the producers by the slump in
the new car market and who would surely find ways to increase prices unless
watched continually. And the Japanese importers would presumably raise
prices to ration their scarce product.
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most narrowly tied to the auto industry and this unspoken pitfall of pro-
tectionism doubtless acounts for much of the vigor in the continuing interest
of the White House, under Carter and Reagan, in free trade.
Thus the coalition for protectionism faces many serious hurdles. However, the
real test on the issue of auto tariffs or quotas is likely to come in
mid-1981 when the economy revives, aggregate car sales pick-up, the industry
has its import fighters in full production, and the special eighteen-month
benefits provided to auto workers losing their jobs due to imports begin to
run out. If the Japanese share of the market remains at the current 28 per-
cent or increases further, pressures may become very strong to accept some
risks with regard to Japanese geopolitical behavior in order to protect the
American market.
Prospects for the third of the "protective" approaches to phase IV are considerabi
brighter. Politicans in both parties eager to avoid tariffs while aiding the
industry have developed a lengthy list of "supply side" aides as well as a
stretch-out of the air quality and safety timetables developed in the early
1970s. The former have the undoubted virtue of providing benefits without
clearly indicating who must pay for them and also function as "negative
tariffs" (i.e., aids to the industry which hold production costs of domestic
products down rather than raising the price of imports) which are more dif-
ficult for foreign producers and governments to identify and protest.
The stretch-out of regulations is of extremely dubious value in making
the industry more competitive in the long run (since the Japanese will also
benefit) but does have the short run virtue of freeing up the industry's
investment capital for retooling for energy efficient models. The political
virtue of a stretch-out is that it is better than abandonment of the goals
fought over in the early 1970s. Public officials can argue that the fourth
stage of the product cycle is a poor time to push hard on the unwanted side-
effects of auto use and that a return of the domestic industry to health is
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central to the long run achievement of environmental and safety goals. Thus it
appears that the industry "wish list" presented to the Carter White House in the
spring of 1980 will be granted in large measure by the Reagan administration. [461
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